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This paper shows that, because of capital accumulation effects, the estate 
tax may increase inequality of income and wealth. If the government 
takes actions to offset hese accumulation effects, the tax will lead to an 
increase in equality of income and wealth. More generally, the paper 
argues that to evaluate the incidence of a tax in a growth context, one 
should compare policy changes which leave the aggregate capital labor 
ratio unchanged; we call this balanced growth incidence. But even 
with the capital labor ratio remaining unchanged, the estate tax may 
increase inequality in the distribution of consumption. 
I. Introduction 
The object of this paper is to introduce a new kind of incidence analysis, 
which I refer to as balanced growth path incidence, and to apply this 
concept to the analysis of the effects of estate taxation on the distribution 
of wealth, income, and consumption. I argue that using conventional 
approaches to the analysis of the effects of such a tax is likely to lead to 
misleading conclusions. More precisely, I argue that, because of capital 
accumulation effects, the estate tax may not achieve the objective to which 
it is presumably directed, that is, equalizing the distribution of income; if 
the government takes actions to offset these accumulation effects, the tax 
will lead to an increase in equality of income and wealth. The desirability 
of the estate tax may still be questioned, not only because of the distortions 
which it introduces but also because it may actually increase inequality in 
the distribution of consumption. 
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II. Capital Accumulation and Inequality 
The reason that the estate tax may not increase the equality of income is the 
following :1 the estate tax may reduce savings; the reduction in savings and 
capital accumulation will, in the long run, lead to a lower capital labor 
ratio; and the lower capital labor ratio will, if the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labor is less than unity, lead to an increase in the 
share of capital. Since income from capital is more unequally distributed 
than is labor income, the increase in the proportion of income accruing to 
capital may increase the total inequality of income. This result hinges on 
three key assumptions (besides the assumption that the elasticity of sub- 
stitution be less than unity). 
III. Estate Taxes and Savings 
The first assumption in the above argument is that the estate tax leads 
to a reduction in savings. There are two aspects to this. First, the estate 
tax can be thought of as a transfer from the individuals who would have 
inherited the wealth to the population as a whole. The latter is effected, 
for instance, by the reduction in income tax which the revenues raised 
through the estate tax allows. The question is, What is the effect of this 
transfer ?
The increased income to the population as a whole will have associated 
with it the conventional marginal propensity to consume out of income. 
The effect of the transfer depends on the magnitude of the marginal 
propensity to consume out of income relative to the marginal propensity 
to consume out of inheritances. If the latter is treated like any other wealth 
(rather than like any other income), as seems likely, then since the 
marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is much lower than that out 
of income, the estate tax has a significant effect on the aggregate con- 
sumption rate. 
The second aspect is concerned with incentive effects. If bequests are 
treated like consumption the n + 1st period of the individual's life (where 
the individual lives n periods), then there is an income effect and a sub- 
stitution effect associated with the tax. The income effect leads the 
individual to consume less during his lifetime, the substitution effect to 
consume more. On a priori grounds it is not possible to say which effect is 
stronger. But even if the individual is induced to consume less to increase 
his gross bequest (so that his net bequest is reduced by less than the 
magnitude of the tax), it does not seem likely that this effect will overcome 
the transfer effect described above. 
'Further reasons why an estate tax might increase long-run inequality are set forth in 
Section VIII below and in Stiglitz (1977). 
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IV. The Concept of Balanced Growth Incidence 
The second assumption in the argument that the estate tax may lead to 
greater inequality because of reduced savings is that the government does 
not or cannot take countervailing actions. Presumably, the government 
through monetary policy could offset any effect on the pattern of capital 
accumulation. 
The question raised here is of import for more than just the analysis of 
the estate tax. A wide variety of taxes affects savings, and the question is, 
in a general equilibrium context, How are we to evaluate such taxes? 
The questions raised are analogous to how we are to evaluate the incidence 
of a tax in the context of the standard macroeconomic model, for the 
tax will have a deflationary effect on the economy so that the equilibrium 
level of national income will be reduced. There is now widespread agree- 
ment that the most meaningful comparisons are among policies which 
leave the level of output constant; for example, we substitute one tax for 
another tax. 
Here it seems to me appropriate to introduce some notion of balanced 
growth path incidence, where we compare policy changes which leave the 
aggregate capital labor ratio unchanged. There are a number of such 
policies: (a) an interest subsidy on savings (essentially substituting life- 
cycle savings for inheritance savings); (b) offsetting the reduced private 
savings by increased government savings; (c) reducing social security 
payments, which again would induce more life-cycle savings; (d) using 
monetary and debt policy to increase the rate of return on capital and 
thus increase savings. 
V. The Distribution of Wealth 
The third basic assumption in my argument that the estate tax might 
increase the inequality of income is that capital is more unequally dis- 
tributed than labor. Although this is undoubtedly true at the present 
time, the question may legitimately be raised of whether this would be 
the case if we had larger inheritance taxes. The answer depends on the 
particular theory of the determination of the income and wealth distribu- 
tion. I now show that, indeed, the inheritance tax may have an effect on 
the equilibrium distribution of wealth, but even if the estate tax has no 
effect on the aggregate capital labor ratio, it may increase the inequality of 
consumption. 
The argument is presented in a model which is a modification of 
that presented by Stiglitz (1969). We assume that (a) individuals leave as a 
bequest to their children what they inherited plus an amount which is a 
linear function of their lifetime income, B(t) = sY(t) - a + B(t - 1), 
where B is the bequest and s is the marginal propensity to save out of 
S140 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
lifetime income; a > 0 is the intercept of the consumption function 
(consumption at zero income). Lifetime income for the ith family is equal 
to their wage income plus interest income, that is, YI = wiLi + rCi, where 
Ci is the amount of (inherited) capital of the family [Ci(t) -Bi(t - 1)], wi 
is the wage received, r the rate of interest, and Li is the number of wage 
earners in the family. (b) Individuals differ in productivity, but the pro- 
ductivity of children is identical to the productivity of their parents (the 
assumption of perfect correlation of abilities). (c) All families reproduce at 
the same rate. In continuous time, we let n be the rate of increase in the 
size of the family. (d) Parents divide their wealth equally among their 
children. 
If we let yi be income per capita in the family and ci be wealth per 
capita and represent he dynamics of capital accumulation of the family in 
continuous time, we obtain 
ei = swi -a + (sr- n)ci (1) 
or, in equilibrium, 
swi-a (2) 
n - sr 
Thus, the coefficient of variation of wealth, yC, is given by 
2 E(ci 
2 
C)2 a2 ' YC c (siD - a 3 
where U2 is the variance of w, and zw is the mean of w. To obtain this result, 
we observe that in equilibrium, if pi is the proportion of the population in 
the ith group, 
sW= - a (4) k pi =n - sr 
where j is the average per capita capital. (In this formulation, there is 
no capital arising from savings within a lifetime [life-cycle savings]; the 
model can, however, easily be extended to that case.) 
If we let yw be the coefficient of variation of (lifetime) wages, and if 
a = 0, yc = y,. The dispersion of capital and wages is identical. If 
a > 0, yc > ym) capital is distributed more unequally than wages. Since 
yi =W-i + rc - - , (5) n -sr 
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n2 2 
n 2 2 _ _ _ _ _ ~~ I2W6 (n - sr)2 / 
= (nL s)2 y2a2 (6) 
[(sy-a) 2 
= ~~~~~~2 -i~~~Y SW-a 
= y2if a = 0, 
where x = share of labor. If a = 0, inheritance has no effect on the 
inequality of consumption. 
We nowx impose an inheritance tax, distributing the proceeds as income 
transfers; if z is the tax rate, the wealth-accumulation equation becomes 
i= (sWi -a + srci + szk) - (n + T)ci, (7) 
and 
k=sz-a + s(r + z)k- (n + T)k. (8) 
Thus, in long-run equilibrium, 
swi-a + s-k 
n + r-sr -9 
sw-a (10) 
n-sr + -c(l -s) 
or k[n + T(l - s)] = sy(k) - a, where y _ w + rk =f (k) = output 
per capita, where f is the (per capita) production function, f' > 0, 
f < 0. Hence, 
dk (1 - s)k (1 - s)k2 (11) 
dT-S sy' - (sy/k) + (a/k) sW - a 
Even if s were constant (there were no incentive effect), capital accumula- 
tion would be reduced.2 
As a consequence, even though if k were constant inequality of wealth 
would be reduced, k is not constant, so the effect of inheritance taxation 
will depend on the elasticity of substitution. 
Assume that individuals differ from each other in a Harrod neutral 
manner, so that y, the coefficient of variation of wages, is a constant with 
taxation, 
vC2 =-5 C -Y-W 2. (12) YC (sj-?+Sk) 2 
2Stability of (7) requires n + Tr > sr, and stability of (8) implies n - sr + r(1 - s) > 
0, or, since k > 0, sv > a. 
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FIG. 1 Inequality at T same as at -r 0; r* minimizes inequality of wealth !7 value of 
w at = 0. 
Thus, 
dy d[(vk/w) (- (a/)] > 0. (13) dr ~~~~dz 
In figure 1 I have plotted Tk/zw and a/sw as a function of T. Note that as T 
increases, k decreases, the wage decreases, and hence a/siwv increases. It is 
immediate that for sufficiently large tax rates inequality must be increased 
(although for small tax rates inequality may be reduced). Inequality is 
reduced with an increase in tax rate so long as 
d[(tk/lzw - (a/swv)] Ik (1 -s)k2 [T /Tk a \ kf" 
______ ____+= - + 
dT w swV -a w w sJ zwj 
= { n + ( -s) - T (- -k 
(14) 
> 0, 
where a = elasticity of substitution -J '(f - kf')/ff"k, or 
[T(1 - x)/u] + (n/l - s) 
r 
(alsfa) + sl (I - s) 
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Since 
w (n + r) - r(a- sTk) 
n + t - sr 
2 - z9(+- 2k I(16) 2 
CD yww(n + t)( - r (a -slk 
Hence, inheritance taxation increases equality if 
d{[sT(l -a)]/((n + T)xJ - ar/[rv(n + T)]} 
dT 
[sn(1 o) arl 1 1-t 1 )o L X z) w (n + T)2 n -sr+ T(I- S) O (7a 
n J T [k ( )( k) 
Figure 2 plots [sr(l - c)]/[Lx(n + t)] -at/[w(n + T)] as a function of 
T. At T = 0. inequality increases if 
a/k(l s) 
(sn + a/k)(n-ST) (17b) 
The tax rate which minimizes inequality can also be calculated from 
(17). The inequality-minimizing tax rate is shown in figure 2. For small 
values of the elasticity substitution, inequality will increase as r increases. 
Note that I have in this analysis ignored the possible decrease in the 
savings rate(s) as a result of the imposition of the tax. That is, the total 
effects with which we have been concerned are those arising from the 
reduction in the aggregate savings rate from transferring "capital" to 
"income"; if s is reduced, as it may well be, the possibility of an inheritance 
tax increasing inequality is even greater. 
Assume, on the other hand, that s changes to keep k constant. From ( 11) 
we know that this requires 
ds (I - s)k (18a) 
dtik Y + Tk 
Hence, 
dyc > 0 d[(Tk/izw) - (a/s&)] d[(tk/lz) - a/szp) 
dTzk dt fk dT 
but 
d[(Tk/lzw - (a/szw9)] k a ds _ - + 0.r > O. 
dT 1 K zw Zjs dT 
,%- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - n+T~~~~~~~ 
o 
sT (1_)> 
/~~ ~~~ X i a-a) a (I-a") 
i t / / ~~~~~~(n+T)ak (n+T)&; 
o 
FIG. 2.- 'c k)-Valueof a and k atT = 0 
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Similarly, 




-ST O -a) ar d _ 
d-(n + T)a C(n + T) nsl 1-) ar 
- 1 ) ds 
+ - >0. 
(n + T)a dT 
Ik 
Thus the "balanced growth path" effects-keeping k constant-are 
as expected. Inheritance taxation does reduce inequality. 
VI. A Two-Class Model 
In a two-class model of income distribution of the kind proposed by 
Passinetti, an inheritance tax has an even greater likelihood (if compensa- 
ting actions are not taken by the government) to increase the degree of 
inequality. 
In such a model, there are two classes: a capitalist class with a high 
savings rate, given by sc, and a working class with a lower savings rate, 
sW. The differential equations governing the accumulation of capitalists' 
capital, kc, and workers' capital, kw, are 
kc = SACk- nkcI (I 8b) 
W= sW(w + rkw) - nkw. (18c) 
The imposition of inheritance taxes alters these equations to read 
kc sckcr - (n + T)kc, (19a) 
kw= Sw(w + rkw + kT) - (n + z)kw, (19b) 
where we have implicitly assumed that all the proceeds of the inheritance 
tax are redistributed to the workers. 
The steady-state rate of interest is thus given by 
r= + (20) 
SC 
and from (19b) we can solve the steady-state ratio of workers' capital 
to aggregate capital: 
[swr - (n + T)] s + l + s ( w (n + Tc) k k 1 - O = - k 
+swa (n + T) + -0, + s~~(l - 
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or 
k =(w + 1 w -cW 
dkWk_ a- I \ SW <0 
IT=- V1 - + n(Sc - SW) 
if a < 1 - a)sC. Thus, for low values of the elasticity of substitu- 
tion, the proportion of capital owned by workers is reduced as a result of 
inheritance taxation. This in turn implies that the share of income of 
capitalists 
r(k - kw) = (1 -kw)(l - 
is increased. Indeed, the critical condition for the share of capitalists' 
income to increase is that 
d{l -a - [(1 - a)SwsCT]I[(n + T)(Sc - SW)] - (SwC)/(sC - SW)} 
[ /dkA (1 - )S.] SC 
L r (n 1(SC-SW) 
= [(1 -Ca) -SW](1 -a)SC > O 
(SC - sw)n 
that is, a < 1 - sW. 
Finally, note that asymptotically, a proportional inheritance tax has no 
effect on the distribution of wealth among the capitalists, and asymptoti- 
cally all workers have the same per capita income and capital stock; 
hence, an increase in the inequality of the share of capital or income 
accruing to the capitalist class unambiguously increases the degree of 
inequality in the economy. 
This model provides an extreme case of the shifting of the tax, resulting 
in effects counter to those originally intended. 
VII. The Distribution of Consumption 
It is not clear, however, whether we are ultimately interested in the 
inequality of the distribution of income or wealth; in some sense, the 
relevant variable is consumption. Under certain circumstances, the 
inheritance tax may actually lead to an increase in the inequality of 
consumption. 
This is the case if the conventional adage of "from rags to riches to 
rags in three generations" were correct, for the effect of inheritances in 
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that case is to spread the consumption of the productive antecedent over 
three generations; disallowing inheritances would have forced the 
antecedent to consume the entire amount himself. 
Within a generation, there is little incentive for an individual to 
transfer wealth to an individual, even a relative, who is better off than he 
is. Most gifts are thus ambiguously equality increasing, in the sense 
discussed by Atkinson (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973). It is 
clear that within a given generation, taxing such voluntary redistributions 
might well increase the degree of inequality, and certainly forbidding 
them would. 
Similarly, it would seem that one of the motivations of parents in 
leaving bequests to their children is that parents who are both able 
(have a high wage) may, if they believe in the process of regression toward 
the mean, expect their children (on average) to be less able than they are. 
Thus, if their children's welfare enters their utility function, they will 
make a transfer payment to their child. On average, it is clear that this is 
inequality reducing, but under certain circumstances I can make an even 
stronger statement. I can show that, if the rate of interest is zero, inequality 
in the distribution of consumption, as measured by the range of the dis- 
tribution, is unambiguously reduced as a result of inheritance. 
To see this, assume that the bequest function B(w, c) is a monotone 
increasing function of wage and inherited capital: Bw > 0, B, ? 0, but 
that the marginal propensity to give a bequest as inherited capital or 
wages increases is less than unity: Bw < 1, B, < 1 (this condition is 
required for stability). Assume, moreover, that B(w min0) 0= . Someone 
who is at the minimum wage and inherits no capital knows that all of his 
heirs will be at least as well off as he and hence leaves nothing to them. 
Then consumption is just C _ w + c - B(w, c), where C is the level of 
consumption. 
In steady state, the maximum value of C is that attained if for an 
infinite number of generations all individuals in a given family line had 
the maximum w, Wmax; accumulation for such a family is given by 
c = B(Wmax, c) - c - nc, which can be solved for the maximum value 
of C, Cmax3 B(Wmax, Cmax) = Cmax (1 + n). Note that when w = Wmax and 
C = Cmax IC = w - nc < Wmax. But ac/aw = 1 - Bw > 0, aC/c = I 
- Bc > 0. Hence C(w, c) < C(Wmax, Cmax) < Wmax. Similarly, it can 
be shown that min C(w, c) = wmin, establishing the desired result that 
inheritance reduces the range of the distribution of consumption. Fig- 
ure 3 illustrates the steady-state range of C. 
If there are only two groups in the population, not only is the range 
reduced by inheritance, but each high-wage individual has his consump- 
tion reduced, and every low-wage individual has his consumption in- 
creased. Regression toward the mean in that case simply means that there 
is a finite probability of a parent of one type having a child of the other. 
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Then a parent of the more able who inherits less than a critical amount 
Cmax will leave to his children (assuming for simplicity that he does 
not know their ability at the time of bequest) an amount in excess of the 
amount that he has inherited, that is, he consumes less than his own wage 
income. A parent of the more-able type who inherits more than cmax will 
consume out of his inheritance, but in steady state no one will ever 
inherit more than cmax. Thus, all individuals of the more-able type con- 
sume an amount less than or equal to their wage incomes, that is, the in- 
come that they would have consumed if inheritances were not allowed. 
The same argument establishes that all individuals of the lower ability 
group consume an amount equal to or more than their consumption if 
inheritances were not allowed. Thus putting a prohibitive tax on inheri- 
tances would be unambiguously inequality increasing. 
A fuller analysis of the effect of inheritance taxation on the distribution 
of consumption requires a more detailed specification of the stochastic 
process generating income. In Stiglitz (1977) it is shown that, provided r 
is not too large, inheritances are inequality reducing. 
VIII. Distortions of the Estate Tax on the Form of Transfer 
I discussed briefly earlier the incentive effects of the estate tax on the 
total amount of bequests left. But there is a further effect of the tax-on 
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the form which bequests take. This distortion arises because of the 
inability to monitor all transfers. In particular, by giving his child human 
capital, he transfers wealth to his child without paying inheritance or gift 
taxes. Since much of the acquisition of human capital does not occur 
within the market sector, it would be virtually impossible to tax such 
transfers. To the extent that this offsets effects associated with imperfect 
capital markets for human capital, the distortion may be desirable; it may, 
however, lead to excessive expenditures on human capital relative to 
physical capital. The ability of parents to transfer wealth to their children 
in the form of human capital also limits the ability to equalize incomes 
through an inheritance tax. Finally, differences in wage incomes may be 
more invidious (in terms of individuals' views of themselves, their status, 
etc.) than differences in capital income. 
A further effect of the tax is to change the composition of physical 
assets. Under certain not implausible circumstances, both of these alloca- 
tive effects may result in the long-run distribution of income and wealth 
becoming more unequal as a result of the imposition of a tax (see Stiglitz 
1977). 
IX. Concluding Comments 
In this article I have focused on several aspects of the economics of 
estate taxes that have received perhaps too little attention in recent dis- 
cussions. These taxes may not lead to the reduction in inequality which 
their proponents desire, but rather may increase the degree of inequality. 
The importance of these considerations depends not only on the values of 
certain economic parameters, which I have identified in my earlier 
discussion, but also on the importance ascribed to these economic con- 
siderations relative to the noneconomic considerations. Accumulations 
of wealth may, it is argued, lead to accumulations of political power and 
affect the nature of our political processes. Opponents of estate taxes are 
concerned with the ethical grounds for restricting this particular class of 
choices of individuals. They ask, Why should parents who do not wish to 
leave wealth to their children but prefer to consume it themselves restrict 
the ability of parents who do wish to leave wealth to their children? 
Although these ethical and political questions may in the final analysis be 
more important in determining policies toward inheritances, it is at least 
worth noting the important economic effects of such policies. 
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